Nick Firth
University of Copenhagen
Merleau-Ponty, Extended Intersubjectity and Narrative
In this paper I begin by arguing that language is not merely expression an expression of thought, but sometimes actually constitutes thought itself. The theory that language can constitute thought has been endorsed by Carruthers (1996). I then argue that this theory, though not without its merits, has been formulated in a methodologically solipsistic manner and, further, that its reliance on a Higher-Order theory of consciousness is problematic. I instead attempt to approach the matter from the both the standpoint of Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) theories on embodiment, sociality and language use, and the Extended Mind Hypothesis. I use this dual framework to examine the implications of the theory for intersubjectivity. To what extent is intersubjectivity extended and therefore able to exhibit ‘we intentionality’? Additionally how does it relate to selfhood? I answer that both of these questions can be examined by looking to Merleau-Ponty’s role of the body as both a private and public locus of action. I conclude by noting that language is inescapably embodied and extended within a social interaction.