Petr Urban
Institute of Philosophy – The Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic
Sharing of the World through Interacting with Others (Animals)
In his recent book L’animal que je ne suis plus, Étienne Bimbenet tells a “phenomenological story” of the difference between human and animal. Following Merleau-Ponty, Bimbenet analyses the peculiar structure of human relationship to the world in terms of “human perspectivism”. For humans, the perceived thing is always constituted by the synthesis of the perspective plurality, which involves the multiplicity of potential perspectives from other perceiving individuals. This human “sharing of the world” (le partage du monde) requires, according to Bimbenet, a peculiar intersection of the relationship to the physical and social environment which comes about due to joint attention. Animals, however perfect they might be in performing each of the relationships, will never reach the intertwining of the both.
Bimbenet’s philosophical approach seems to find a strong empirical support in the work by Micheal Tomasello and his colleagues, who claim that shared intentionality, including joint attention, is virtually non-existent in nonhuman animals. According to their studies, even the most social and intelligent animals – chimps – are not interested in sharing their psychological states with others or meshing theirs with others to create joint psychological enterprises. Therefore, these researchers conceive of shared intentionality and joint attention as “a small psychological difference that made a huge difference in human evolution in the way that humansconduct their lives”.
Firstly, I will argue that Bimbenet adopts the questionable mentalist framework of the current on joint attention and theory of mind, which also makes up the background of the most research by Tomasello’s team. Secondly, I will show that an interactionist phenomenological approach to social cognition (inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s views on intersubjectivity) grants us a more appropriate understanding of joint attention and shared intentionality. Finally, I will refer to the work by current psychologists and ethologists, such as Tim Racine, David Leavens and Kim Bard, and I will present their empirical studies supporting interactionist and non-mentalist views on shared intentionality, and obviously contradicting the alleged human uniqueness of “sharing of the world” in the triadic structure of experience.