Stefano Vincini
University of Memphis, USA
Merleau-Ponty and the Child’s Sense of Self and Others:
Syncretic Confusion or Primitive Differentiation?
Relying on evidence from studies of newborn imitation, Gallagher and Meltzoff (1996) criticized Merleau-Ponty’s endorsement of “syncretic sociability,” the claim that infants live in a state of original confusion between self and others. Further, both the philosopher Dan Zahavi (2004) and the developmental psychologist Philippe Rochat (2003) distinguished different levels of the self-other distinction and argued for the presence in the infant of an embodied sense of self. Nonetheless, the debate has recently been reopened by a number of authors (Welsh 2006; Maclaren 2008; Whitney 2012) who defend Merleau-Ponty and insist that “distinctness” and “myness” are late products of sensory-motor and affective interactions. Both sides make use of empirical evidence and phenomenological considerations; however the multilayered complexity of the problem is often not recognized. In my paper, I briefly present Merleau-Ponty’s view on the genesis of the self-other distinction as it emerges in his Sorbonne lectures on child psychology (1949-1952) where he employs the psychology of his time (Piaget, Wallon, Schilder) in a way that is at the same time insightful and problematic. I then turn to findings in contemporary developmental psychology that are helpful in clarifying different stages of self-other psychogenesis: these include work by Stern (1985) and Trevarthen (2011). Taking the perspective of phenomenological psychology, I argue that pre-reflective self-other differentiations must already be in place in order for the full-fledged reflective division between myself and the other as distinct selves to occur. Since important aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of intersubjectivity rest upon his developmental assumptions – indeed he contends that self-other indistinctness is never completely abolished – my critical considerations will hint at some amendments to Merleau-Ponty’s general theory, while still acknowledging the strengths of his interactive and direct-perception account.